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The Political Demography of the World System,
2000–2050
Paul Demeny
Geoffrey McNicoll
ABSTRACT
Population policies are deliberately constructed or modified institutional arrange-
ments and/or specific programs through which governments influence, directly or indirectly,
demographic change. For any given country, the aim of population policy may be narrowly
construed as bringing about quantitative changes in the membership of the territorially cir-
cumscribed population under the government’s jurisdiction. Governments’ concern with
population matters can also extend beyond the borders of their own jurisdictions. Thus,
international aspects of population policy have become increasingly salient. Additions to
the population are primarily the result of individual decisions concerning childbearing. Within
the constraints of their social milieu, these decisions reflect an implicit calculus by parents
about the private costs and benefits of children. But neither costs nor benefits of fertility are
likely to be fully internal to the family: they can also impose burdens and advantages on
others in the society. Such externalities, negative and positive, represent a  legitimate con-
cern for all those affected. The essay briefly discusses how individual and collective inter-
ests were reconciled in traditional societies, summarizes the population policy approaches
adopted by the classic liberal state, and sketches government responses to the low-fertility
demographic regime that emerged in the West between the two World Wars. In greater
detail it considers international population policies after World War II and contemporary
population policy responses to below-replacement fertility.
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By the end of the twentieth century the bipolar competition of the Cold War had ended
and the market economy model was triumphant. Economic globalization—greatly expanded
international trade and capital movements, and even, to a limited extent, cross-border mo-
bility of labor—had spread beyond the developed countries and East Asia, although very
unevenly. Thus the developing world, by then four-fifths of mankind, had become far less
homogeneous in both its demographic dynamics and its income per capita than it had been
at midcentury. It included many middle-income countries and several emergent economic
giants, all of them intent on rapid economic growth and eventual emulation of the high-
consumption economies of the West and Japan. The giants—China, India, and Brazil—
additionally displayed nascent ambitions for regional and even global projection of influ-
ence in political, military, and cultural as well as economic domains. But the developing
world also contained large regions of persistent economic backwardness and a few even of
retrogression, conditions aggravated by still-rapid demographic growth. At the same time
the forces of globalization had begun to create social and economic strains in the affluent
countries that, in combination with aging populations, aging workforces, and incipient popu-
lation decline, seemed to put in doubt the sustainability of their own gains in economic
welfare and called into question the applicability of their economic success as a model for
the rest of the world.
The social sciences offer no means of forecasting the evolution of this global eco-
nomic and political system over the next half-century—not even of distinguishing, among
the plausible drivers of change, those that will in retrospect be judged the most significant.
Recall how little of the world of 2000 was foreseen in 1950. But while steering clear of
prediction, we can at least lay out some of the trends that are underway and explore their
implications. Moreover, in comparison to some other efforts at future-gazing, we can call
on the relatively robust structural frame that demography supplies. Compared to the rate of
turnover and obsolescence in physical capital and technology, people are long lived. Some
40 percent of the population of 2050 (and probably about the same proportion of the labor
force) is already alive in 2005—whereas much of the technology and a large part of the
capital stock of the economy in use in 2050 have yet to be created. Moreover, mortality and
fertility also tend to change in fairly predictable ways with industrialization and urbaniza-
tion, giving some assurance to population forecasts at least over the next several decades.
(Based on past experience, uncertainties mount up rapidly thereafter.)
POPULATION AND ECONOMY: FORECASTS TO 2050
The near-worldwide decline of fertility over the second half of the twentieth century
has taken the “population problem” off the agenda of international relations. That relega-
tion is unfortunate. It misconstrues the likely role of the demographic factor in the world
system during the coming decades.
The United Nations estimates for 2000–05 put the average total fertility rate (TFR) for
the more developed countries at 1.6 children per woman, and for the less developed world
at 2.9. There are large contrasts in age distributions between regions—still relatively youth-
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ful in the less developed regions, exhibiting advanced population aging in the developed
world—reflecting the timing and pattern of past fertility and mortality declines. The me-
dium UN projections envisage gradual convergence in demographic behavior and eventu-
ally also in age distributions. Over the coming decades, however, this convergence will not
prevent continuing large shifts in relative population sizes between regions and among major
countries.
The same UN projections foresee global population growth between 2005 and 2050 of
2.6 billion—a net increase larger than the total world population in 1950. That increase is
distributed highly unevenly across world regions. Holding constant the categories of “more”
and “less” developed (admittedly, labels that have become increasingly vacuous1), the popu-
lation of the more developed regions is projected to grow by only 25 million. This is despite
the assumption that net immigration into those regions will amount to 98 million during the
45-year period. Thus, 99 percent of the global growth is expected to occur in the less devel-
oped regions.
Among major regions, Europe (including Russia) shows the most pronounced loss in
terms of relative size. Its population was 22 percent of the world’s total in 1950. By 2005
that figure had fallen to 11 percent. In 2050 it is expected to be 7 percent. In absolute terms,
Europe’s population is estimated to be 728 million in 2005. Despite an assumed net immi-
gration of 32 million persons during the next 45 years, a further improvement in its mortal-
ity, and a recovery of its fertility from the current TFR of 1.4 to 1.85 by midcentury, the
continent’s population would fall to 653 million in 2050—that is, 75 million below its
present level.
At the other regional extreme, Africa’s population is projected to continue its rapid
growth. Africa’s share of global population was 9 percent in 1950, increasing to 14 percent
in 2005. It will be 21 percent in 2050. Its projected absolute population growth during the
next 45 years is more than 1 billion.
Table 1 sets out the anticipated growth in the first half of the twenty-first century
against the previous half-century for major countries and regions. The spacings in the table
loosely delineate three North–South segments of the globe. Africa and Western Asia are
reconfigured into sub-Saharan Africa (as the UN defines it) and a group of countries termed
the “Muslim tier”—significant in this study especially as a major source of immigrants to
Europe.2
This differentiated pattern of demographic expansion yields a new clutch of heavy-
weight countries in the world. Arbitrarily identifying these as countries with populations
above 100 million, the picture given by the UN estimates for 2005 and medium-variant
projections for 2050 is shown in Table 2. Some rearranging of the list takes place over this
period, with India overtaking China, and Pakistan and Nigeria moving up in the size rank-
ing. No country is forecast to drop out of the list in this period, but Japan and Russia are not
far from doing so. Emerging demographic heavyweights are Congo, Ethiopia, Philippines,
Uganda, Egypt, Viet Nam, Iran, and Turkey. (Astonishingly—and implausibly—these pro-
jections place Afghanistan barely lower, reaching 97 million by 2050.)
No European Union member country appears in Table 2. However, if the EU with its
current composition (EU-25) is taken as constituting a state-like entity, it would appear with a
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population of 460 million in 2005—third, after India and ahead of the US—and 450 million in
2050—still third, but by then some 20 million below its peak and within range of a still-
growing United States. Of course, the EU may have expanded further by midcentury: acces-
sion of Turkey, should it occur, would alone raise its 2050 population by nearly one-quarter.
Such population figures take on a fuller meaning in combination with current eco-
nomic conditions and their plausible future evolution. If so considered, they suggest a ma-
jor gain in the coming decades in the economic weight and thence the geopolitical impor-
tance of the Asia-Pacific region and of South Asia, in comparison to the North Atlantic—
the region which, at least for the last two centuries, has held a preeminent position in the
global hierarchy of economic and military power, scientific and technological prowess, and
cultural influence. China, and at a farther distance also India, may soon rival the United
States in gross domestic product. For example, in recent forecasts by Goldman Sachs, China’s
GDP exceeds that of the United States around 2040, India’s a few decades later. At purchas-
ing power parity, by 2001 China’s economy was already three-fifths the size of that of the
United States, India’s one-quarter. (In comparison, in that year by the same measure, Latin
America’s economy was 39 percent of that of the United States, Africa’s 15 percent.)3
Major per capita income differentials between currently rich and poor countries will,
however, persist. Continued faster economic growth in per capita terms in the less developed
world in comparison to the rich countries—the broad experience of recent decades, though
with important exceptions—must eventually close that income gap, but even under the most
daring assumptions in most instances this process will be far from completed by midcentury.
In the Goldman Sachs forecasts just cited, China in 2050 would have a per capita income
roughly equal to the average of the developed world around the turn of the millennium. In the
early phases of the catch-up process, of course, it is virtually an arithmetic certainty that
absolute per capita income differentials between countries will further widen.
Finally, the staggered pacing of demographic transition among world regions is re-
flected in a remarkable variation in the forecast levels and rates of increase in the propor-
tions of youth and the elderly (see Table 3). Provision of old-age support, private or public,
has mainly entailed pay-as-you-go transfers from workers or taxpayers to retirees. The fig-
ures in Table 3 signal the increasing fragility of that mechanism as the proportions of the
young and the old move in opposite directions. The order shown in the table corresponds to
the comparative stage in the aging process: Japan and the EU in the vanguard, Africa bring-
ing up the rear. China, with its precipitous fertility decline in the 1970s and 1980s, is two or
three decades ahead of India.
Long-range forecasts of dependency ratios—as defined in demographic terms4—are
sensitive to assumptions about fertility and longevity (especially life expectancy at older
ages), both of which are straddled by substantial confidence intervals. (Levels of immigra-
tion also affect dependency, but, as noted below, not by much at the ranges that are likely to
be politically acceptable to countries of immigration.) A fertility recovery that yielded family
sizes nearer two than one is not impossible in Europe and Japan, albeit unlikely in the view
of many observers. The course of mortality at older ages in the developed world is even more
uncertain—a further consequential matter for the financial condition of pension funds. The
nearing approach of high old-age dependency combined with these uncertainties pushes gov-
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ernments toward adoption of retirement schemes involving individual retirement accounts,
in which savings and later dissavings take place over each person’s life cycle.5
MIGRATION AND IDENTITY
Income differentials, in combination with relative population sizes and rates of in-
crease, clearly point to the continuation and the likely intensification of migratory pres-
sures, with the potential to generate massive population movements from poor to rich coun-
tries. To what extent such movements actually materialize is a different matter. Migrant-
receiving countries seldom plan the number of migrants to be admitted beyond the next few
years—and where plans do exist, they can be and are revised at will or altered by circum-
stance. The migration assumptions incorporated in the UN projections, such as those cited
above, are arbitrary, hence purely illustrative. They typically assume, country-by-country,
continuation of the volume of the migrant stream estimated for the most recent past, or at a
somewhat reduced level. The actual number of migrants may turn out to be far greater than
this. Mexican migration into the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, poorly
signaled the massive influx from Mexico in more recent decades.
Migration may also turn out to be smaller than simple extrapolations suggest. Public
opinion in the main receiving countries, especially in Europe and more specifically in the
European Union, has, on balance, increasingly favored less migration—a sentiment rein-
forced by recently heightened tensions surrounding Europe’s Muslim minority and by the
volume of unskilled migration into the United States. Strict enforcement of the rules adopted
in this sphere could greatly restrict migration flows, both legal and clandestine. Yet enforce-
ment is costly in economic terms and infringes on other values and preferences of the native
population. Moreover, in every immigrant-receiving country there are numerous persons
and interest groups strongly favoring relaxation of rules in particular cases or for particular
types of immigrants: their wishes often prevail over the weakly expressed preferences of
the greater number of those favoring tighter restrictions.
Such differences in attitude are typically strongly correlated with position in the in-
come or class hierarchy. Whether in their private capacity or as entrepreneurs, more affluent
segments of the population disproportionately benefit from greater access to low-wage do-
mestic service workers or to wage laborers willing to work for wages below the rates that
native workers would demand. At the same time, wealthier persons are apt to have less
exposure to situations that may be seen by many as discomforting, such as the changing
ethnic make-up in residential areas or in the schools their children attend. Persons in lower
income classes bear the brunt of such exposure.
An often-repeated argument favoring immigration invokes the economic and social
problems associated with population aging and the “needs” of the labor force. The influx of
migrants, it is held, rejuvenates the age structure and fills jobs that otherwise would go
unfilled. Migrants, if employed, thus ease labor force adjustments and prop up the pension
and health care systems of the receiving country. But as demographers know, this, at best, is
a temporary remedy for population aging. Immigrants also age; they eventually cease to be
workers and taxpayers and become claimants on pensions and other entitlements. To main-
7
tain the rejuvenating effect would require sustained immigration on a scale that over time
would radically change the numerical balance between natives and immigrants—a trans-
formation unlikely to be welcomed by most persons in the receiving country. That transfor-
mation—David Coleman calls it the third demographic transition—is accentuated where
native–immigrant cultural differences are large and migrant acculturation to the mainstream
is slow. Cases in point are European cities like Rotterdam and Birmingham.
Within broad limits, modern industrial societies should be able to cope with the eco-
nomic and social problems caused by population aging without recourse to immigration.
The institutional changes required for that purpose are well known. The availability of an
apparently “easier” solution for those problems, through immigration, allows societies to
avoid the needed reforms—as well as to avoid thinking seriously about policies to encour-
age higher birth rates.
In filling labor force needs, the advantages and disadvantages of immigration would
have to be compared to alternative means of adjustment, whether policy-induced or arising
in response to market signals: mobilizing labor reserves from the native population; devel-
oping and adopting technologies that substitute for labor; upgrading wage rates to elicit
labor supply responses; and, not least, eliminating activities that could only be sustained
with low-wage labor. Each of these adjustments, whether applied separately or in combina-
tion, has its costs. Over time these costs may, however, prove to be lower than those entailed
in the reflexive reliance on immigration.
The migration solution looks easy because of the magnitude of the supply pool of
potential migrants—a function of income differentials and relative population sizes.6 Al-
though geographic proximity now has less influence on migration decisions than in the
past, when transportation and communication costs were higher, the point may be illus-
trated by comparing migrant-receiving countries with potential sender countries in the same
general geographic neighborhood.
The European Union provides the principal case in point. (The North American case is
similar in many respects, apart from its higher native-born fertility levels and its more flex-
ible labor market.) Consider the three EU countries with the largest net immigration—
Germany, Britain, and Italy—and the three largest potential migrant suppliers in the EU’s
“southern neighborhood”—Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. In 2005, the comparative population
sizes of each group are almost the same: 204 million in the three EU countries, 217 million
in the three countries of the southern neighborhood. For the next 45 years, the UN assumes
net immigration of 9 million into Germany, 6 million into Britain, and over 5 million into
Italy and substantial, although less massive, emigration from Egypt, Turkey, and Iran. None-
theless, the medium projections for 2050 show a major shift in comparative population
size: a slight decline, to 197 million, in the three EU countries, but a 50 percent rise, to 329
million, in the southern three.7 Per capita income (2002 estimates in purchasing power
parity terms) was above US$25,000 in each of the three EU countries; it was about $6,000
in Turkey and Iran and less than $4,000 in Egypt.
Vastly greater pools of would-be EU migrants exist in other parts of Africa and West
Asia. Indeed this whole region might, somewhat provocatively, be called Europe’s “south-
ern hinterland.” Its relative size contrasted with the EU itself, past and projected, is shown
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in Figure 1. Clearly, there is the potential for immigration into the EU on a much larger
scale than is assumed in the UN projections. The same is true for other high-income areas,
not only the traditional immigration countries—United States, Canada, and Australia—but
also Japan and other prosperous East Asian countries and perhaps some emerging Latin
American countries such as Brazil. More to the point, the potential flows are larger too than
envisaged by any of the migrant-receiving countries. Should such flows materialize, they
would amount to only a modest downward correction to population growth trends in the
sending countries but could radically change the demographic make-up of the receiving
countries. Both historical experience and present-day indications suggest that such changes
can have unwelcome consequences—cultural, economic, and political—whenever assimi-
lation of migrants proves to be difficult, whether because of attitudes prevailing in the re-
ceiving society or attitudes of the migrants themselves.
The right to determine who is admitted as a migrant is fundamental to the modern state
system. In practice, as suggested above, the complex mixture of gains and losses that are
entailed and the interplay of interest groups with stakes in the outcome make the decision-
making process inherently difficult. Moreover, sending countries may also claim a stake—
through their concern for relieving domestic unemployment, for the well-being of their expa-
triate citizens, and, more tangibly, for the remittance flows that may be generated. This spread
of claims has suggested to some a case for international regulation of migration. In the 1920s,
Albert Thomas, then director of the International Labour Office, asked whether the time had
come “for considering the possibility of establishing some sort of supreme supranational au-
thority which would regulate the distribution of population on rational and impartial lines, by
controlling and directing migration movements and deciding on the opening-up or closing of
countries to particular streams of immigration” (Thomas 1927). Such ideas resurface in con-
temporary policy discussions in the international arena—for instance, Kofi Annan’s remark in
a 2004 speech that “migration is an issue that demands greater international cooperation—
norms and policies to manage migration in the interest of all.”8 While any move toward shar-
ing policymaking responsibility with sending states would no doubt be resisted by the receiv-
ing states, the issue introduces an additional level of uncertainty in forecasting the volume and
direction of international migration in the coming decades.
For temporary labor migration, joint decisionmaking is certainly to be expected. Such
schemes, bringing in migrants on work contracts for a fixed period, could be established to
the mutual benefit of the receiving and the sending countries (justifying a quid-pro-quo in
the form of material compensation for the sender), and, of course, of the migrants them-
selves. Although there are successful models for such guestworker arrangements, their po-
tentials have not been much explored. An expansion of temporary migration, skilled and
unskilled, has been under consideration in the United States in response to employer pres-
sures and, in the unskilled case, as an offset to more stringent border controls. Such schemes
should be of particular interest to countries in which popular sentiment is unequivocally
against permanent immigration, such as Japan. Short of draconian administration, full en-
forcement of the return provision for guestworkers (presumably to be replaced by new
recruits) is not to be expected, but that goal is not necessarily a condition for success pro-
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vided return rates can be kept high. A side benefit of such a scheme could be its use in
selecting participants to be offered permanent residence.
Migration within the countries of the European Union presents a special case of inter-
national migration. The label “international” is warranted, as EU countries retain major
elements of national sovereignty. Treaties guarantee citizens of member countries the right
to free movement, for whatever purpose, within the Union. (Labor migration from coun-
tries that joined most recently is subject to temporary restrictions by some members of the
EU-15.) Through the Schengen agreement, involving a large subset of the continental EU
countries, the right to free movement and settlement is also guaranteed to persons to whom
any Schengen member country has granted permanent immigrant status. When differentials
in income are minor, as in the case of the EU-15 countries, labor migration is likely to be
small, an outcome reinforced by cultural and linguistic barriers. Few persons from Munich
wish to take up work in Lyon, and vice versa. Labor migration from the rest of what is now
the EU-25 has greater potential, evidenced by the labor inflow to Britain and Ireland (espe-
cially from Poland). But the most important migration type within the EU in the coming
decades may turn out to be retirement migration—retirees attracted to parts of Spain, for
example, in a pattern similar to that observed in Florida or Arizona in the United States.
Outside the EU, while free trade agreements have proliferated, the more radical inte-
gration involving common markets for labor has been rare. Australia and New Zealand
have such an arrangement. Some regional groupings—notably ASEAN—have at times con-
templated doing so.9 The North American Free Trade Agreement, in contrast, has deliber-
ately refrained from promotion of cross-border labor mobility—indeed NAFTA was origi-
nally seen by some as a kind of bulwark against unregulated inflows to the United States
and Canada. A fortiori that would be true of any extension further southward, as in the
Central American Free Trade Agreement or the bruited Free Trade Agreement of the Ameri-
cas (FTAA). In practice, as noted earlier, regulatory efforts to curtail migration reflect the
diversity of economic and political interests in the matter, typically combining fairly strong
if less than effective border controls with lax enforcement of employer sanctions.
This discussion is necessarily inconclusive, but it clearly suggests that migration flows
from less developed countries to the rich countries during the next half-century—especially
to North America and the European Union—will be at least as large as and possibly signifi-
cantly larger than those observed in recent decades. At the same time, it seems probable that
receiving countries will raise their expectations of migrant cultural assimilation and adopt
more stringent control and surveillance measures (border security and registration or ID
requirements), in part in response to xenophobic and nativist reactions by their citizenries.
These measures notwithstanding, by midcentury both of these continent-size areas are likely
to have populations far more varied by ethnic and cultural background and by geographic
origin than they were at the turn of the millennium.
FRAYING SOVEREIGNTY: FISSION AND COALESCENCE
Countries are creations of history: their continuity over time is not carved in stone.
They can split into smaller units or merge to form larger entities. The post–World War II
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period brought a proliferation of national units. This was largely the result of the disman-
tling of the colonial empires, the last phase of which was completed with the gaining of
independence by the 15 former republics of the Soviet Union. Disintegration of some arti-
ficial national constructs contributed to the process, such as the separation of Bangladesh
from Pakistan, Singapore from the Malay Federation, Eritrea from Ethiopia, and the split of
the former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia into their major constituent units. The division
of Korea into two separate states solidified after the 1953 armistice. Southern Sudan is
promised a future opportunity to break from the country’s Arab north.
It is possible to see this pattern as the triumph of atavistic nationalist hatreds over the
economic logic of market size, but closer examination tends to reveal the continued relevance
of economic motives. Often the impulse to secede comes from an economically successful or
fortuitously resource-rich subregion of a country, seeking to preserve or enhance its position
by erecting barriers to entry.10 The lessons of the economics of German reunification are read
as proving the merits of disunity in rich South Korea; the economic success of Hong Kong
holds a lesson for Shanghai as well as for China’s several eastern provinces.
Subnational devolution of political power, short of national independence, is also in
evidence, potentially offering the devolved entity greater economic returns (perhaps con-
cealed in nationalistic rhetoric) while remaining under the security umbrella of the state.
Quebec is an example, as are, in Europe, Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, Corsica, Wallonia,
and Flanders. Far-reaching regional autonomy was built into the postwar reconstruction of
Germany as a federal republic, and devolution by legislative reform gave greater powers to
regions in France and Italy. Striving for movement in similar directions has been evident in
many other countries as well, illustrated by the examples of Nigeria, Indonesia, Philippines,
and Sri Lanka.
Is the present configuration of states approaching some near-permanent form or will
the process of fission continue indefinitely? Working against further change is the entrench-
ment of the principle of national sovereignty in the United Nations Charter and in the every-
day workings of international institutions. Efforts to override it by acknowledging a right to
self-determination for some aspiring national entity (self-determination is also a UN prin-
ciple)—or even to protect human rights in the face of egregious government violations—
have been rare. A few states—perhaps Iraq included—may yet hive off separate nations;
Russia could shed some troublesome Muslim territories along its southern borders. Ascen-
dant powers, however, encounter few challenges in dealing as they please with minor would-
be states on their fringes, such as Sikkim or Tibet.
The reverse phenomenon to fission—the consolidation of multiple political units into
one—has seen few examples in the past 60 years. The most notable is the merger of the
former East Germany into the Federal Republic. And of signal importance, although not
classifiable under the traditional category of independent statehood, is the creation of the
European Union. Starting with the six-country association under the 1957 Treaty of Rome,
by 2004 the EU encompassed 25 states, with a population of 457 million, pledged to form
“an ever closer union.”11 Member states preserve essential elements of sovereignty but cede
by treaty many former state functions to a common, nonterritorial, political machinery head-
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quartered in Brussels. Whether it should espouse more thoroughgoing federalist ambitions
or settle for the less radical “Anglo-Saxon” confederate model remains a matter of dis-
agreement among the member states, with far from predictable resolution.
East Asia has a number of efforts at regional integration. ASEAN, now including all
Southeast Asian states except East Timor, is well established, seen by some as eventually
growing into an EU-style entity. Institutional thickening can be measured in the continual
invention of new ties among member governments, the progressive easing of bureaucratic
barriers, and the profusion of meetings, dialogues, and working groups. There is no Brus-
sels in view, however, let alone a regional parliament. It remains more an intergovernmental
organization than a superstate manqué.
Integration across East Asia as a whole has not progressed as far but may have greater
prospects. A Japan-centered East Asian economic system seemed in the cards in the 1970s
and 1980s, with massive Japanese investments in the region creating a set of burgeoning
economies following in Japan’s train. (Lingering memories of Japan’s colonial and wartime
interventions precluded such relationships extending much beyond the economic.) But then
came the dramatic slowing of Japan’s economy in the 1990s, coinciding with China’s eco-
nomic take-off fueled by the rapid strengthening of the investment and production networks
of “greater China” (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). By the end of the century it was
apparent that any emerging East Asia–wide economic system would be centered on China,
not Japan.12 A plausible institutional framework for an East Asian community is the group-
ing known as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), adding China, Japan, and South Korea to the ten
ASEAN states.
Moves toward regional coalescence, at least in the economic sphere, are also seen in
the other major world regions. SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Coopera-
tion) formally brings together all South Asian states, though it could also be seen as defin-
ing India’s hegemonic reach—aside from Pakistan’s sometimes awkward inclusion and
potential role as spoiler. But India’s rapidly increasing economic strength and place as an
emerging world power arguably gain little from that grouping.
Latin America south of Mexico, once to be accommodated by NAFTA’s transforma-
tion into the Americas-wide FTAA, is now more often seen as an emerging region in itself,
building on its two main existing trade pacts, Mercosur and the Andean Community. An
envisaged continent-wide South American Community of Nations (CSN) would be explic-
itly modeled on the EU—even to a common passport and currency. Brazil is set to remain
the region’s heavyweight power: its GDP in 2004 was four times the size of Argentina’s, the
next largest economy (though not yet surpassing Mexico’s). In the Goldman Sachs fore-
casts, it would be closing on Japan’s GDP by 2050.13
The Middle East and North Africa, from the Maghreb to the Gulf, has a loose political
identity in the 22-country Arab League and has displayed sporadic aspirations to unity.
There is substantial labor migration within this region but little basis for a strong regional
economy. Finally, the African Union—successor to the Organization for African Unity—
has a broad integrative ambition, if as yet with scant accomplishment. In the words of the
African Union Commission (2004: 16), “Africa must form vast and viable internal markets
12
to…pave the way for inter-African division of labour according to relative domestic and
external advantages, and confer on these huge collective entities a genuine power of nego-
tiation with the markets already constituted on other continents.”
The present and projected population sizes of the main regional groupings are shown
in Table 4. Together these now make up 88 percent of the world population, a proportion
that would be maintained in 2050 under the assumption of unchanged country composition.
Market size, of course, would yield a different ranking, with the EU and NAFTA currently
well ahead but ASEAN Plus Three rapidly catching up and SAARC also becoming a major
market force.
The more general change that permits moves toward “ever closer union” in regional
groupings, but that extends beyond regionalism, is a shift in the meaning of national sover-
eignty itself. Such a change is signaled by the popularity of adjectives like virtual or
postmodern to describe certain countries. The “virtual state,” analogous to the virtual cor-
poration—a company “with a head but no body”—supplants the older trading state that was
obsessed with territory and resources and worried about locating production within its bor-
ders (see Rosecrance 1996). Japan, Korea, and Singapore are in the vanguard of virtuality;
China and Russia remain “territorial fetishists” (ibid.). Postmodernity as a political charac-
terization appears in the work of international relations theorists like Buzan (1998) and
Cooper (2003), who divide countries into premodern, modern, and postmodern. The mod-
ern group is made up of the conventionally-sovereign states that first emerged in seven-
teenth-century Europe and gradually became a universal model of statehood, spreading
worldwide with the ending of the colonial empires. The premodern countries are the Somalias,
Afghanistans, Sudans, and Liberias—characterized by “low levels of sociopolitical cohe-
sion and poorly developed structures of government” (Buzan 1998: 223), whether not yet
having reached modernity or having degenerated into political disorder and ungovernabil-
ity. And the postmodern are those that have begun to relax their sovereignty. “Postmodern
states have a much more open and tolerant attitude toward cultural, economic, and political
interaction, and define a much narrower range of things as threats to national sovereignty”
(ibid.: 221–222).
The postmodern world is the one taking shape in Europe, envisaged in the treaties
underpinning the European Union (“a highly developed system for mutual interference in
each other’s domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages”—Cooper 2003: 27), the
Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, with
glimmers of a wider application indicated by a slew of international treaties on matters such
as security, justice, and the environment. America, in this classification, is in many respects
still a “modern” state, its concessions to internationalism (principally the WTO) often re-
luctant and subordinated, when deemed necessary, to national interests. In East Asia, China
is modern, Japan postmodern.
Is postmodernity, in this political sense, the all-but-inevitable path for the world as a
whole as globalization proceeds, or a fairly special outcome among a few groups of like-
minded states? Consideration of demographic realities, undertaken below, would suggest
the latter is the more likely.
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DEMOGRAPHY AND GLOBALIZATION
The large income differences that drive contemporary international migration are the
results of a long process of uneven development. In a stylized depiction of economic his-
tory, each country journeys from a position of poverty along a path toward greater material
comfort. Some countries progress rapidly, others lag behind. The speed of advance is not
uniform: overtaking and backsliding occur, gaps between countries narrow or widen. At
least since the industrial revolution, however, Europe and its overseas offshoots, notably
the United States, along with Japan, have led the pack. Their lead increased considerably
over the last century.
The factors explaining the economic ranking at any moment are complex, intertwined,
and often deeply rooted in the past. Among them are differences in acquisitiveness and in
aptitude in seeking material advancement; ability to develop institutions conducive to thrift,
trust, and cooperation beyond kin groups; interest in science and in its practical applica-
tions; favorable geographic location, climate, and access to natural resources; military prow-
ess and skills in making and maintaining peace; and willingness to take risks and luck in
having them pay off. A host of others could be added.
One of these factors, again in interaction with others, is demographic behavior. During
their modern history, the presently rich countries benefited from the economic stimulus of
spurts in population growth, yet they avoided the kind of expansion that, by natural increase
alone, can multiply a population eightfold or more during a single century. Europe, in particu-
lar, could have built up a population that today would be a numerical match to China or India,
or that could even have surpassed those countries in size. But, under the guidance of fortuitous
institutional structures, Europe’s aggregate population growth was kept in check during its
modern history. By the late twentieth century, under circumstances of unparalleled prosperity,
Europe was approaching zero population growth. Its countries developed elaborate welfare
states, promising, and to a large extent providing, material comforts and security to every
citizen. Europe seemed prepared to settle down to enjoy the pleasures of a stationary state.
Europe’s offshoots in North America and Oceania retained much the same demographic
pattern of moderate to low natural increase (births minus deaths). Their distinctiveness lay
in tolerating and even promoting a large migrant influx, accommodated initially by an open
land frontier and subsequently by similarly open labor markets—and, in the US case espe-
cially, more modest provision of an economic safety net.
Being born in one of these rich, stable societies in effect automatically imparts a gift—
an unearned rent traceable to the wise demographic choices, individually or in their aggre-
gate result, made by ancestors in a parade of generations reaching back into the deep past.
Those seeking entry into these lucky countries by immigration can be thought of as trying
to capture that same rent by the only other available route.
Threats to the European social model
Ironically, even before being fully able to realize its promises, this “European social
model”—both in Europe and in its counterparts elsewhere—is now under threat. It is men-
aced from two developments, each of which has a key demographic component.
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The first of these threats is overshoot in the reduction of fertility. Bringing fertility to a
long-run replacement level is a historical imperative. Falling somewhat under replacement
need not be differently characterized: fertility cannot be fine-tuned to 2.06 children per
woman. For a long period, affluent industrial societies could certainly live with a slow
decline in their populations and adjust to the economically less advantageous age structure
associated with it, without suffering grim economic and social consequences. But should
fertility settle at a level deeply below replacement, the rapid fall-off in population numbers
together with the associated age structure—resembling, if plotted as an age pyramid, a pear
stood on its stem—cannot be accommodated. Short of a policy-engineered revival of fertil-
ity, which, of course, has a long (20 years plus) lead time, mass immigration then becomes
the only possible remedy. The scale of migration called for, however, elicits the kinds of
responses discussed earlier in this chapter. Not least among them would be the erosion of
political support for the redistributive measures of the welfare state.
The second population-linked threat is external: it arises from the processes of global-
ization, which draw mature postindustrial, post–demographic transition societies into eco-
nomic interaction with materially much poorer societies—societies that have a different
demographic past, different current demographic configurations, and different demographic
prospects.
Economic theory supplies a convincing demonstration of the advantages of extending
the scope of economic interactions from the narrowly local to the national and, beyond that,
to the global level. Although the demonstration is studded with massive ceteris paribus
assumptions that dictate caution, it is evident that larger markets permit greater division of
labor, stimulate competition, specialization, innovation, and higher productivity, and pro-
vide their participants with access to a greater variety of goods. In so doing, the enlarged
market delivers higher incomes and promotes economic growth: it makes individuals and
countries richer.
Historical experience bears out the thesis. The first great epoch of globalization, the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, brought rapid economic growth in the leading
industrial countries and sparked the beginning of industrialism throughout the rest of the
world. The drastic curtailment of international trade by protectionist policies in the interwar
years was associated with low growth and eventually with the misery of the Great Depres-
sion. After World War II, renewed efforts at international liberalization resulted in a vast
expansion of international trade and unprecedented prosperity.
But that postwar success story was, in fact, geographically quite limited, and hence is
a less than compelling argument for the merits of globalization. Much of the expansion of
trade took place among the rich countries. These countries possessed similar or fast-con-
verging levels of income, rendering them natural partners in trade. The second world—the
Soviet Empire, with China nominally also included—was not part of the emerging free
trade zone. Neither was India, an official admirer and would-be imitator of the Soviet pre-
war ambition of “socialism in one country.” The countries of Africa mostly espoused and in
part practiced “African socialism,” and those of the Middle East similarly experimented
with local varieties of the socialist model. Ideology also kept much of Latin America out-
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side the revived world market: interaction with the “center” was seen as perpetuating pe-
ripheral status and solidifying economic dependency.
The conspicuous exceptions to these stand-apart regions were the market-oriented coun-
tries of East Asia. Guided by the visible but skillful hand of their governments, these “tiger
economies” seized the opportunity for rapid industrialization offered by trade with, and
unimpeded flow of capital investment from, the leading capitalist countries. Strategic con-
siderations in the context of the Cold War helped to make the West a willing partner in these
exchanges. But relative demographic size clearly facilitated that willingness. Even if Japan
is included among the newly industrializing trading partners—and, of course, by the 1970s
Japan was solidly positioned within the core of the capitalist world—their combined popu-
lation, or, more relevantly, the combined size of their potential labor resources, represented
a small fraction of the labor force of the leading capitalist countries. Any pain from losing
industrial jobs to the East Asian tigers was clearly overshadowed by the economic gains
generated by increased trade.
Not surprisingly, the lessons of success are eventually absorbed by others, and the
recipes are adopted. The big turnaround came in China, marked by the Dengist reforms of
the early 1980s that freed trade between China and the outside world and opened the Chi-
nese market to foreign investment. The ranks of imitators thereafter grew rapidly. The latest
major convert to the advantages of exploiting the global marketplace has been the formerly
autarky-seeking, reform-socialist India. Today, despite the loud protests voiced at succes-
sive World Social Forums, ostensibly speaking on behalf of the world’s poor, there are
hardly any less developed countries that wish to shut themselves off from globalization.
For the industrialized countries, however, this new globalization of globalization pre-
sents an unprecedented challenge. It places them in competition with newly emerging in-
dustrial countries that possess labor forces, actual and potential, vastly greater in size than
their own and does so under circumstances in which the former advantages that favored
them in such competition are rapidly disappearing. The problem is highlighted in warnings
insistently issued to the citizenry in the EU and, with less justification, in the United States:
“You must work harder and longer than before; you must give up privileges to which you
have grown accustomed; and even if you do so, your job may evaporate tomorrow.” Why?
“Because of globalization! You are in competition with countless millions of workers in
faraway lands who are eager and able to do what you do and do it just as well, and are
willing to do it for wages that are a fraction of yours.”
Such rhetoric in part simply draws attention away from problems that have nothing to
do with globalization but derive from features in the existing design of systems of social
protection that are becoming unsustainable because of population aging. These problems
require domestic reforms, regardless of the extent of exposure to foreign competition. But
the element of truth the warnings contain, when considered alongside the demographic
realities alluded to, warrants further examination. What is at issue is the viability of the
WTO trade regime from the standpoint of the developed world over the lengthy period—
perhaps decades—during which technological differences between the demographic giants
largely vanish but substantial wage differentials persist.
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Offshoring and the demographic overhang
In the past, the relatively high wages (and high non-wage costs) prevailing in the rich
countries were routinely explained and justified by the higher productivity of their work-
ers. That competitive edge derived from advantages that developing countries were once
unable to replicate—a well-educated labor force that has privileged access to the best tech-
nology and to superior complementary factors of production such as management and mar-
keting skills, organizational prowess, modern communication and transportation infrastruc-
ture, and a secure and healthy environment.
These advantages have fast been eroding as transnational corporations increasingly re-
create them in locations where labor costs are much lower. Transferring industrial produc-
tion to other countries then becomes an option favored by an elementary economic calculus.
The wage differentials are initially seen in the “rubber shoes, bicycles, and umbrellas”–type
manufactures. In the West, many one-time worriers about Japan’s postwar economic pre-
dicament thought such products would be Japan’s future way of earning a (modest) living
through exports. Today no observer could miss the ability of China or India to produce a vast
range of consumer and capital goods using the most advanced technologies, and their ability
to sell such goods more cheaply than those manufactured in the high-wage industrial coun-
tries. China’s Minister of Commerce, Bo Xilai, sought to defuse European objections to high
levels of textile imports by remarking that China would need to sell 800 million shirts to
afford one Airbus A380 (China Daily, 5 May 2005). A more significant calculation he did not
essay was how long it would be before there was a Chinese-built A380.
Services are similarly prone to “offshoring” from high-income countries, and, as with
manufacturing, skills in themselves offer no necessary protection. The criterion, as Blinder
(2006) has noted, is whether the output of a job can be delivered electronically: “Janitors
and crane operators are probably immune to foreign competition; accountants and com-
puter programmers are not.” Many jobs in the personal care industry—a growth sector in
any country with an aging population—cannot be exported. And at least for a while, head-
quarters of transnational enterprises may remain in the centers from which much of the
capital and most of the technology driving the new industrialization still originate. In this
last case, however, even if such geographic specialization could be seen as permanent,
favoring a well-compensated elite, not everybody in the former seats of manufacturing can
be a banker, a lawyer, an advertising and public relations executive, marketing strategist,
systems analyst, or management consultant. Moreover, research and development activi-
ties—the laboratories that power innovation and raise productivity—are among the stron-
gest current candidates for outsourcing to China and India. The “symbolic analysts” who
were to maintain the technical edge of the West’s postindustrial economies are then as likely
to be found in Shanghai and Bangalore as in Silicon Valley or the two Cambridges.
A more promising and steady jobs-assuring and export-earning large industry in the
advanced stage of international specialization could be tourism—say, between the EU and
the emerging modern Asia. In essence, Europe could be transformed into a huge theme
park, geared for the entertainment of curious visitors, increasingly comprising the newly
rich of Asia. In the ensuing equilibrium position, general material affluence might reign.
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But such a future, even on aesthetic grounds, would not appeal to countries with the memory
of a quite different history.
Enthusiasts for globalization, whether seeing it as accelerating world development or
as improving returns to capital, do of course recognize the major adjustment problems that
offshoring imposes on developed-country workforces—even after taking account of the
lower prices of the foreign-sourced goods and services and, partly in consequence, lower
inflation. But they argue that any disadvantage is temporary: currencies will adjust to cor-
rect some of the trade imbalance, and industrial wages will quickly rise in the new loca-
tions. The problem with this expectation lies in the sheer demographic scale of the emerg-
ing economies. China and India, and many countries coming behind them, have large labor
reserves in the traditional sectors of their economies that will not be exhausted for decades
to come and will keep wages down. (That expectation is not belied by signs of upward
pressure on wages, as observed recently in urban China. More probable explanations would
point to temporary labor market frictions and educational bottlenecks.) For the West, more-
over, a shift in manufacturing locations from China or India to Vietnam or Bangladesh
would be no gain: the bottom line is the still-massive rural and fringe-urban populations in
emerging manufacturing economies, providing several decades of something approaching
an “unlimited” labor supply. As long as these populations exist and can be mobilized, per-
mitting wage equalization upward would retard full modernization of the countries that
possess them.
The absolute numbers of potential entrants to the modern economy are sobering. UN
projections of urban growth extend only to the next 25 years, but they show proportions
rural in 2030 still at 40 percent in China and nearly 60 percent in India (Table 5). In China,
admittedly, that population will by then be aging rapidly; but elsewhere, notably in India,
the cohort of entrants to the labor force shows only modest fall-off—even, as seen in Table
6, under the UN’s most optimistic scenario of fertility decline. (Table 6 also indicates the
mounting uncertainties in these forecasts beyond 20 to 30 years, reflecting different but still
quite feasible assumptions about trends in fertility.) The overall demographic contrast over
time with the United States and the European Union, the two main components of the West,
is seen in Figure 2.
This line of argument is set out in only the sketchiest terms, and may seem overdrawn.
But its consideration in the ongoing debate about the merits of globalization is likely to be
unavoidable. The weight of academic opinion, especially among economists (for example,
see Lal 2006), is on the side of pushing ahead along the track we are on. But popular opin-
ion disagrees, and its potential for exploitation by populist demagogues is all too real.14
Are there alternative models for the organization of the international system over the
next few decades that might lessen the opportunity for and appeal of demagoguery? One
that is worth fuller consideration (it is discounted by Lal) might be described as “regional
quasi-autarky.” What this entails is not a return to inward-looking protectionism at the
country level: that has no attraction—if indeed it were even feasible. But a regional group-
ing of countries of comparable income levels, together offering a substantial productive
base and internal market, could make good sense. A European Union is large enough, with
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nearly half a billion people, to exploit almost all conceivable economies of scale (perhaps
only the Airbus actually requires a global market) and to provide a competitive environ-
ment assuring innovation and steadily improving product quality. Within its boundaries its
rules already forbid protectionism. And it is large enough to provide balance—a diversity
of industries and activities allowing for complementarities and unplanned synergies. How
much more advantage can be squeezed out of extra diversity, in a region where Finns rub
shoulders with Portuguese and Irish with Greeks? In short, as a region in itself the EU
could flourish with a fair degree of autarky (energy excepted), working primarily to satisfy
its internal market. The same recipe could fit North America or a larger Western Hemi-
sphere grouping. And something similar could be fashioned from what some already call
China’s co-prosperity sphere, or an analogous region for India. These regions (say, those
identified in Table 4) could live in peace with each other—a supposed attribute of democ-
racies—and also trade. The EU needs some exotic spices; its citizens want to visit the
Great Wall, the Grand Canyon, and the Taj Mahal. Mutatis mutandis, each of the other
regions has comparable needs and desires. As with the EU and the United States today,
there would be no objection to crafting special trade relationships in support of particu-
larly backward economies.
In a more remote future, setting aside all that may go wrong, population pyramids
around the world will even out—and, we can hope, will not have converged to the inverted
pear-shaped structure. Worldwide economic prosperity of a sort will have been attained. In
such a world, true globalization is likely to emerge as a real option. That future, however,
not least for solid demographic reasons, is not within our grasp in the next 50 years.
AN UNDERCLASS OF STATES?
The “global” in globalization and the global economy thus far and perhaps well into
the future is less than all-encompassing. A significant number of countries have fairly neg-
ligible links with the major trading economies aside from the trickle of imports financed
by foreign aid; others have substantial exports but deriving from extractive-industry en-
claves with revenues diverted to a narrow elite in the society. For whatever reason—there
are many candidates—these countries have not managed to find or hold to the develop-
ment path taken by the successful emerging economies. Disproportionately they are lo-
cated in sub-Saharan Africa.
Per capita GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, based on Maddison’s (2003) calculations, has
hardly moved since the 1970s. The two vaunted regional high-flyers, Botswana and Mauri-
tius, are impressive exceptions but their combined populations amount to less than 0.5 per-
cent of the regional total. The past ten years have seen an improvement in this dismal record,
which some observers believe may presage a larger turnaround under which Africa would
slowly regain the economic promise that it possessed in the immediate aftermath of
decolonization in the 1960s. That, at least, is the vision promulgated by the Commission for
Africa, whose 2005 report was endorsed by the G-8 and by major foreign-aid donor agen-
cies. It is implicit in the rhetoric of the African Union and its NEPAD (New Partnership for
Africa’s Development) initiative. The factors militating against such a turnaround, though,
are formidable.
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The AIDS epidemic is one such factor. The bleak future for sub-Saharan Africa por-
trayed by Christopher Clapham (2006) has much to do with AIDS. The extraordinary fall in
life expectancy at birth beginning in the 1990s in South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe—
by 20 years or more, to numbers not seen at a country level for many decades—presents
huge development problems in addition to the tragedy it represents for individuals, families,
and communities. Predictions of the future course of the AIDS epidemic vary widely—
indeed, even estimates of current HIV prevalence rates are often questioned—but many ana-
lysts have retreated from earlier dire predictions of a continent-wide pandemic. Some coun-
tries that had experienced high rates of HIV prevalence and AIDS mortality in the early years
of the epidemic have managed to reduce both; others, against expectations, seem to have
largely avoided epidemic rates of infection. These outcomes apparently stem from some
combination of health education, modifications in sexual behavior, interventions to prevent
mother-to-child HIV transmission, and the fortuity of particular cultural practices (such as
male circumcision, which apparently lowers infection risk). It is not wholly implausible that
even without wide access to effective medical treatment—still a distant prospect for much of
the region—the impact of the disease will gradually subside to a level that, while still seri-
ous, is more comparable to that of other health risks.
Heavy AIDS mortality over coming years but a less-than-dire scenario for the duration
and spread of the epidemic are the assumptions made in the current UN population projec-
tions for Africa. As Table 2 showed, the medium projections for 2050 foresee a Uganda of
127 million, an Ethiopia of 170 million, a Congo of 177 million, and a Nigeria of 258
million. Overall, sub-Saharan Africa is expected to grow from 0.75 billion in 2005 to 1.69
billion in 2050; at midcentury, even though average fertility is assumed to have halved from
its current level, the absolute annual increase in population would still be growing. This
added weight of numbers will be a burden on development efforts and intensify already
severe problems of governability. Glib assertions about economy-boosting demographic
bonuses provided by favorable youth-dependency ratios—the potential reallocations from
consumption and capital-widening expenditures to growth-enhancing investments—pre-
suppose just those conditions of social order and administrative capacity that rapid popula-
tion growth threatens.
A sanguine prognosis for the region would see some countries doing well (South Af-
rica is the main hope among the larger economies) and many others, in one way or another,
advancing at a pace sufficient to allow substantial improvement in social and economic
conditions. Even under such a favorable outcome it is all but certain there will also be
laggards and backsliders. States that combine poverty, economic retrogression, and perva-
sive domestic insecurity can be described as failing or, where these conditions have been
longstanding, as “failed.” African examples include Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Guinea,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The category is far from clearcut
and by no means precludes a state so described eventually regaining a foothold on the
development path—though it may be starting from a much lower position.15
Failing or failed states are not found only in Africa. Afghanistan, East Timor, Haiti,
Iraq, Nepal, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, and Yemen are among others that also fit the
description. Few are populous: only in sub-Saharan Africa and perhaps the south-western
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Pacific do such states amount to a significant fraction of their respective regional popula-
tions. By some assessments, however, states “at risk” include Nigeria, Bangladesh, and
Pakistan. That would lend the problem a truly ominous global dimension.16
But even a lack of significance in economic and demographic terms does not mean
that failed states have no bearing on the evolution of the global economy and polity. The
energy exporters among them obviously remain important in a tight suppliers’ market for
fossil fuels. Others figure disproportionately as sources of refugees and, through criminal
and terrorist activity, as regional destabilizers or even threats to more distant states. And
without functioning civil administrations, they are ill-equipped to combat infectious dis-
ease or environmental destruction, both with potential for damaging spillover effects be-
yond their borders.
UNCERTAINTIES AND SURPRISES
The varying assumptions underlying population forecasts like those of the United Na-
tions concern the pace of fertility transition,17 which in turn reflects the course of economic
growth and cultural change. As was discussed above and in Chapter 1, such forecasts can
go seriously awry over a span of half a century even without effects that would count as
surprises. Interestingly, however, most of the dramatic events that are thereby ignored—
wars, famines, floods, plagues—are barely visible at the broad regional scale and not at all
at the global level. Thus the 1959–61 Great Leap Forward famine in China, perhaps the
largest in history, killing some 30 million, can hardly be discerned in an East Asian popu-
lation series. AIDS deaths in the tens of millions in sub-Saharan Africa go with a projected
net addition of one billion persons in that region (150 percent) over the half-century to
2050.18
In his assessment of the risks of other such “fatal discontinuities” in this period, from
asteroid collisions to microbes and nanobots, the geographer (and polymath) Vaclav Smil
(2005a) finds most of the usual candidates for worldwide catastrophe comfortably distant
or improbable.19 Influenza and war are the main exceptions—with broadly similar risk-
fatality profiles. A worldwide influenza epidemic is seen as unavoidable in the next few
decades—the unknown being whether its fatalities can be kept down to a few tens of mil-
lions.20 Precisely because its effects would be so widespread, however, a flu pandemic is
not likely to be a destabilizing force in the global political economy. That is not true for war,
which ample historical precedent shows can be genuinely transformational. While encour-
agement can be taken from the declining trend in major conflicts over the twentieth cen-
tury,21 what in the past have turned out to be transformational wars have sometimes been
wholly unforeseen.
Discontinuities in the evolution of the global system can come about without mass
fatalities. Environmental change offers several such scenarios, and doubtless many others
that have not been imagined. The gradual atmospheric warming over the twenty-first cen-
tury, predicted by general circulation models of the climate system, is the best known of
these scenarios—its most severe effects coming later in the century but likely to be clearly
visible well before. There are potentially large implications for the regional distribution of
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agricultural zones, for the prevalence ranges of particular infectious and parasitic diseases,
and for coastal erosion and flooding from a rise in sea levels, in addition to drastic effects on
the nonhuman biota. Rising fossil-fuel use and resultant greenhouse gas emissions, the
main anthropogenic factor in global warming, owe more to economic than demographic
expansion. But per capita emissions, bound to rise fast in China, India, and the other main
emerging economies even under optimistic assumptions about abatement technologies, are
multiplied by these countries’ huge population numbers.
Wealth brings improved means to adapt to change, so global inequalities will be ac-
centuated by these environmental effects. Many poor countries are particularly vulnerable.
New food-deficit regions will probably emerge—and new areas of surplus—calling for
major adjustments in the international trade in cereals. Coastal settlement will be affected:
in more alarmist scenarios, “environmental refugees” would be created in great numbers.
Responsibility for damage, once assigned, elicits demand for compensation. In the
international arena such claims are sometimes recognized—for wartime occupation, for
instance—typically through ad hoc bilateral negotiations. The possibilities of broad-scale
damage to particular groups of countries through climate change may elicit claims of an
altogether greater magnitude. The guilty parties—guilty of a kind of aggression, from one
perspective—would be the industrialized countries, many of them not only current large
emitters but the main contributors to the build-up of greenhouse gases over decades past.
Adjudication of such claims may well devolve into more rounds of debate like those that
have taken place in follow-up meetings on the 1992 Climate Convention (one of which
produced the Kyoto Protocol), yielding treaties notably lacking in enforceable sanctions for
nonperformance and with few repercussions on other spheres of international relations. Or,
it may be that these distributional issues originating in environmental change will become a
dominant concern for the international system.
Climate modeling of the kind that underpins the projections of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change yields smooth output trajectories—a warming, say, of a few de-
grees Centigrade by the end of this century. But sudden climatic shifts, beyond the predic-
tive ability of current models, also seem possible. A widely publicized scenario of this sort
is for ocean warming to disrupt heat circulation by ocean currents in the North Atlantic, and
in particular to halt the moderating effect of the Gulf Stream on the climate of Western
Europe. (Edinburgh and Copenhagen are on the same latitude as Moscow.) Research on the
fine detail of climate history has uncovered many instances in the distant past of abrupt
regime change—major (say, 10∞ C) rises or falls in mean temperatures in a region, some-
times taking place in a period as short as a decade but lasting perhaps for centuries.22 What
can set off such events is unknown, but their existence adds to the range of uncertainty
surrounding the effects of present trends in atmospheric composition.
Climate change aside, environmentalists also point to looming problems of degrada-
tion of ecological services—the often unpriced benefits humans receive from the various
ecological systems they are part of. Examples of ecosystem services are crop pollination,
fresh water supply from streams and aquifers, natural processes of soil formation and ero-
sion control, nutrient cycling, and photosynthesis. Mounting evidence indicates that many
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such services are being degraded or drawn on at unsustainable rates, as a consequence of
population growth, economic expansion, and poor management practices.23 Here too there
are many possibilities for repercussions for human well-being and for economic and politi-
cal systems beyond national borders.
A particular class of ecosystem service has to do with the aesthetic values humans
derive from the natural environment. Those amenity values can in some measure be price-
rationed like ordinary goods and services, thereby limiting adverse congestion effects for
users. Population growth itself has been a factor in the enclosure or privatization of many
common-access resources. But given the choice, most people would likely resist that
privatization route beyond modest limits, preferring to retain open access. Unless other
kinds of rationing can be devised, degradation through overuse becomes a serious risk.
David Victor (2006) addresses these issues in relation to wilderness areas. The international
spillovers implicated in wilderness preservation or wilderness destruction are mostly intan-
gible—the satisfaction many people find in knowing of their existence, and the pain over
their loss—but not a negligible element of welfare. Some conservation efforts attempt to
translate those sentiments into monetary terms.
FUTURES FOR THE DEMOGRAPHIC FORERUNNERS
In the very long term, beyond the time-horizon of this essay, full or near-full global
convergence in demographic patterns might be achieved, along with—most would no doubt
hope—a fairly stationary population or one trending slowly downward to a preferred global
optimum. That is the future that the cosmologist Fred Hoyle (1963), in a brief foray into
demography, called dull (his less-dull alternative was a time-series of population explosions
and collapses), although a vision of human continuity is hard to reconcile with large depar-
tures from demographic stationarity. Dullness is not a risk over the next 50 years.24
The coming half-century is likely to see the ending of massive global population ex-
pansion—at least, if the UN medium-variant projections are borne out.25 The demographic
marginalization of the countries currently classified as “more developed” vis-à-vis those
classified as “less developed” will proceed apace, with a ratio of 1:10 in births virtually
unchanged over the period. The striking contrasts in age structures across countries and
regions will also persist, although lessening by midcentury.26 These differentials and trends
have ramifying effects on the international political economy. For the more developed coun-
tries, they pose dilemmas for public policy, the chosen resolution of which will have pro-
found implications for the societies and cultures that emerge.
Low fertility was discussed above as one of the main threats to the European social
model, as it is to Japan’s also. Continuation of the ultra-low fertility now experienced in
Japan, Russia, and parts of the EU leads to a rapid and hard-to-reverse downward trend in
population. Under the UN low-variant assumptions, for instance, Japan’s and Italy’s popula-
tions would both diminish by nearly one-quarter by 2050, Russia’s by more than one-third.
Future levels of fertility stuck below 1.5 children per woman are quite plausible—even as a
Europe-wide average—implying, if maintained, generational population declines (aside from
migration) of more than 25 percent. Accompanying those declines would be burgeoning pro-
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portions of the old and very old, requiring costly medical care (and invidious rationing).27 As
a long-run prognosis offered as an option in a policy debate, this demographic outlook might
well be judged unacceptable. Its presence in the background sets the stage for consideration of
expanded immigration on the one hand and pronatalist measures on the other.
Mere numbers, of course, are only the simplest of the issues that migration policy
needs to be concerned with, but they are a convenient starting point. Low or moderate rates
of immigration, combined with expectations of (and supporting measures for) integration,
are unexceptionable responses to below-replacement fertility. Migration at rates that would
be needed to significantly offset very low fertility, however, is a different matter. Integra-
tion then becomes far more problematic, and there is a likelihood of generating or further
exacerbating serious cultural tensions. Even moderate inflows can yield high urban or fringe-
urban concentrations of immigrants, impeding assimilation—and, in the subsequent gen-
eration, producing alienation and anomie among persons with cultural roots in neither their
parents’ society nor the one surrounding them.
Heavy reliance on migration, as earlier remarked, is in some sense an easy option for
public policy, assuming that ethnic and cultural tensions can be kept in check. But in avoid-
ing the institutional reforms that would be called for in adapting to a low-fertility, aging
society, political leaders and their constituents are setting the stage for a deeper societal
transformation. Historically, of course, that has happened often enough, but it entails a
potentially huge loss of cultural patrimony. Such a calculation may no longer have much
force in affluent, late-capitalist societies—with individualism triumphant and self-fulfill-
ment acknowledged by many as a principal goal. But realization of impending transforma-
tion can also be a potent generator of populist reaction.
Maintaining fertility at a level that does not fall much below a two-child average—say,
around 1.7–1.8—would largely avert this problem. Such levels (arguably creditable to some
extent to supportive population policies) are found in some countries of Western and North-
ern Europe and in Australia and New Zealand; in the United States, fertility is even higher.
But for those many countries in Europe—and for Japan—where levels are well below 1.5,
that prospect is dim.28 There are narrow limits to welfare-state generosity in bribing would-
be parents, especially when the state is already overburdened with pension and health-care
costs. There is a reluctance to make family allowances disproportionately high for third or
later children—or for higher-income parents. There is lingering ideological resistance to
the state trying to override personal preferences about childbearing. There is a strong eco-
nomic interest in increasing female labor force participation, which, policy efforts notwith-
standing, is a discouragement to childbearing.29 And the state is powerless to counter cul-
tural and value changes that favor low fertility or even childlessness. It is possible to imag-
ine a spontaneous recovery in birth rates, like the prosperity-linked baby boom in the years
after World War II or, more speculatively, through some radical cultural shift—a millenarian
movement?—as yet unforeseen. The role for social policy in engineering an upturn, how-
ever, seems fairly marginal.30 Even if an upturn were to happen, moreover, it would take a
quarter-century before the new homegrown labor force began to be felt in the economy; the
migration alternative is at hand and has no delay.
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As this discussion makes clear, the post-transition demographic predicament of the
low-fertility West—the European Union and Japan most notably—is both serious and in-
tractable. That appreciation should argue for concentrated deliberation over what kinds of
societies and economies these countries should be trying to construct for themselves and
about how they might protect them through the remaining decades of the global demo-
graphic transition. Over most of that time they must expect to be continually challenged by
low-wage but high-skilled competitors in the world’s populous dynamic economies over
the whole range of tradable goods and services; at the same time, they will face continued
clamoring for entry to their societies by a stream of would-be economic migrants and refu-
gees from fragile or failing economies. Against these formidable pressures they must seek
to maintain the levels of social protection and leisure and the other components of the
quality of life that affluence has won for them, in the face of further population aging and
steadily diminishing numbers of native-born labor force entrants. If nothing more, the de-
liberation called for might begin a process of strategic thinking about these issues, helping
to avert a day-by-day caving in of policy to narrowly based interests and recourse to least-
effort political remedies. In the long run, if environmental and other dangers can be held in
check, most human societies will have to find their way through the same demographic
landscape, hence the experience of the forerunners should have much to teach.
In the United States, fertility has remained close to a two-child average, well above
European and Japanese levels, and immigrants—even unskilled immigrants, provided
they carry the requisite documents—are broadly welcomed. (The main caveat on migra-
tion applies to the large inflow from Mexico, seen by some as the making of a cultural—
even political—reconquista.) Hence, there is no prospect of population growth ceasing in
the foreseeable future. Medium Census Bureau projections show the 2050 US population
at 420 million, almost 50 percent above the 2000 census count; decadal increases are
undiminished, in the range of 25–30 million.31 The words of the 1972 Commission on
Population and the American Future (“recognizing that our population cannot grow in-
definitely,” and recommending “that the nation welcome and plan for a stabilized popula-
tion”—the population was then 210 million) have been decisively sidelined if not alto-
gether rejected.
In its absence of a sense of national population scale or interest in stabilization, the
United States is something of an oddity in the developed world.32 What might eventually
change that situation is unclear: localized congestion does not seem to. The contrast with
other rich societies may extend to views of economic growth as well—albeit with elements of
caricature on both sides. The vision Keynes spelled out in 1930, echoing John Stuart Mill a
century earlier, plausibly resonates more in Europe and Japan than in the United States. The
struggle for material goods, said Keynes (1963: 365–366), should not be “the permanent
problem of the human race.” He looked for a time when both material and demographic
growth will have ceased, with attention turned to intellectual and aesthetic endeavors.
[F]or the first time since his creation man will be faced with his real, his permanent
problem—how to use his freedom from pressing economic cares, how to occupy the
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leisure, which science and compound interest will have won for him, to live wisely
and agreeably and well.
A contrasting vision of the pursuit of happiness is that described by Richard Easterlin
(1996: 153–154)—a perspective with a distinctly American flavor:
The future, then, to which the epoch of modern economic growth is leading is one of
never ending economic growth, a world in which ever growing abundance is matched
by ever rising aspirations, a world in which cultural differences are leveled in the
constant race to achieve the good life of material plenty.
The world in which either of these futures might be near to realization will also contain
plenty of economic laggards. Some will be on an upward path—eased, no doubt, by flows
of investment funds from the developed world, seeking economic returns wherever they
can be found. But others might be more in the position of wards of the international com-
munity—though exposed to an ever-present risk of default on the part of that community
and with their prospects worsened to the degree that any exceptional human talent they
produce is siphoned off. Foreign assistance will still have a role, both in covering troughs in
food production and in promoting development and demographic transition. Whether it can
do so without repeating the many fruitless efforts of the past—by drawing on mature reflec-
tion on what should have been done in the last half-century—is far from certain.
NOTES
1 As the earlier comments indicate, those labels are already highly tenuous. Conve-
nience and convention are their only defense.
2 The term “Muslim tier” is used in Demeny (2003), where it refers to an arc of 25
predominantly Muslim countries from Pakistan to Mauritania (excluding former So-
viet republics); here it is defined so as to exclude five of those 25 countries that the
UN places in sub-Saharan Africa.
3 Goldman Sachs forecasts from Wilson and Purushothaman (2003); purchasing power
parity estimates for 2001 from Maddison (2003).
4 Typically, the dependency ratio is defined as the population below age 15 and aged 65
and above divided by the population aged 15–64. This age range is of course arbitrary
and, especially in advanced economies, at best a crude reflection of reality.
5 Individual accounts, however, offer no more protection than pay-as-you-go schemes
against the risk of falling market value of accumulated capital caused by the shifting
proportions of workers to retirees. On this “asset meltdown” prospect linked to popu-
lation aging, see Poterba (2005).
26
6 Future latecomers to population aging, and economically disadvantaged countries in
general, do not have recourse to such a solution. Its present-day use, therefore, has
some characteristics of a Ponzi scheme.
7 The contrast is even sharper if the comparison looks only at workforce ages—say, the
age group 20–59. In 2005 the 20–59 population in each of the two groups is about 110
million. Over 2005–2050, the EU group drops to 89 million, the southern neighbors
increase to 172 million.
8 See Annan (2004). It is now often argued that the logic of globalization should lead
not only to free movement of goods and capital but also to free movement of labor.
For example, the report of the ILO-sponsored World Commission on the Social Di-
mension of Globalization (2004) called for “a multilateral framework for immigra-
tion laws and consular practices…that would govern cross-border movement of
people,” paralleling similar frameworks for “cross-border movement of goods, serv-
ices, technology, investment and information.”
9 At least for professionals. (Malaysia periodically expels undocumented Indonesian
workers.)
10 Boniface (1998) argues on those lines, seeing the rush toward secessionism as driven
by efforts of the territorially clustered rich to shed obligations toward the adjacent
territorially clustered poor.
11 The impending entry of Bulgaria and Romania and, almost certainly, Croatia would
add some 34 million to form an EU-28.
12 See MacIntyre and Naughton (2005). A recent conference report from the US Na-
tional Intelligence Council (2004) foresees “China’s benevolent dominance” of the
region in economic and security affairs as likely to be in place by 2020.
13 World Bank (2005); Wilson and Purushothaman (2003: 9). Maddison’s estimates for
2001 show Brazil’s economy already one-third larger than Mexico’s (Maddison 2003:
134).
14 A link between the demography of globalization and reactionary populism—but re-
ferring to immigrant European labor in the United States rather than to production
outsourcing, and to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century rather than to the
present era of globalization—is discussed by James (2001).
15 A summary of a recent conference of “top US experts on Sub-Saharan Africa” gives
a more somber appraisal: “there is a class of African countries—which includes Burkina
Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—that are so bur-
dened by their extreme climate, related problems of health and disease, and poor
geographic position that it is not clear that any economic model offers them a path
toward development” (US National Intelligence Council 2005).
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16 A “failed state index” published annually by the magazine Foreign Policy lists no
fewer than 60 countries “at risk,” containing one-third of the world’s population.
17 The assumptions concerning future trends in mortality and international migration
are the same for each of the variants.
18 The low-variant projection shows a 118 percent increase over 2000–2050; the high
variant, 189 percent.
19 Smil (2005a: 229) summarizes his findings and informed speculations on the risk and
effect of “massively fatal discontinuities” in a simple graph plotting number of fatali-
ties against probability of occurrence over the next 50 years on a double log scale. At
10 percent probability—a risk that many would regard as considerable reason for
worry over that time interval—the three globally significant calamities are an influ-
enza pandemic of a scale to cause around 50 million deaths, war (around 20 million
deaths), and volcanic eruptions or tsunamis (1 million deaths). At 100 percent, the
fatality expectations for the three events are about 25 million, 4 million, and 150,000
respectively. Asteroid collisions, the reader is pleased to discover, are not something
to lose sleep over, with a 10 percent risk of about 50 fatalities. (An impact causing
one million fatalities is put at .01 percent probability for the period.)
20 Other as yet unknown viruses with epidemic potential may well be in the wings, able
in the right circumstances to cross to humans from animal hosts (see Lederberg 1988).
21 See the data and time-series compiled in Human Security Centre (2005).
22 See National Research Council (2002).
23 Bleak depictions are set out in great detail in the authoritative Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment reports. See «www. millenniumassessment.org».
24 Smil (2005b: 636) concludes his two-part essay on the subject as follows: “[I]f you
take a long look back and then try to discern what may come, if you ponder the
reiteration of catastrophe throughout history and think about human irrationality, ha-
tred, and drive for power and dominance, and about the fate of aerosols, bees, and
bacteria, then you might conclude that, despite so many atrocities, failures, and fears,
the past 50 years were an exceptionally stable and an unusually benign period in
human history and that the probabilities of less benign events will greatly increase
during the next 50 years.”
25 The medium-variant of the UN long-range projections published in 2004 shows world
population edging up from 8.9 billion to 9.1 billion in the half-century after 2050 and
subsequently dropping back. (The low–high ranges, however, are large: 7.4–10.6 bil-
lion in 2050; 5.5–14.0 billion in 2100.) See United Nations (2004, 2005).
26 While in both regions the absolute number of the elderly will expand dramatically,
the proportions will still be far greater in the more developed countries. The 80+
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population in 2050 is projected to amount to 15 percent and 12 percent in Japan and
Germany, 7 percent and 3 percent in China and India. The corresponding absolute
numbers in this age group will be 17 and 10 million in Japan and Germany, 101 and
53 million in China and India. (United Nations 2005.)
27 Future technological breakthroughs, anticipated by some experts, may extend the
human lifespan well beyond the business-as-usual extrapolations assumed by the
United Nations. Within countries this could heighten the tensions inherent in allocative
decisions on publicly financed health care (access could hardly be denied to those
willing to pay). It also has the potential to generate analogous international dissatis-
factions, or at least to amplify envy.
28 To an appreciable extent, very low levels of total fertility (TFR) defined at a given
time are a consequence of women delaying their childbearing to later ages, rather
than cutting back on their completed family size. That delay option has an evident
biological upper limit which, as it is approached, may lead to some recovery in TFR.
How significant such a recovery might be in practice is not known.
29 The main pronatalist policy mantra—make female labor force participation compat-
ible with childbearing—has obvious limits: it virtually rules out families with three
or more children, but not childlessness.
30 An avenue for social policy that for the most part has yet to be explored will be
concerned with anticipated developments permitting genetic engineering in utero or
in vitro. Parents would likely demand a major role in what, in effect, would be grass-
roots eugenics, but there is an equally evident public interest in the matter—albeit
well short of Brave New World scenarios. International differences in the ethical prem-
ises and design of such social policy (the requisite know-how would rapidly spread
among the technologically adept) may be substantial.
31 US Census Bureau (2005).
32 The reasons probably have to do with the concentration of immigrants in a few states
and the design of congressional representation in the two houses. (Scale is also a
matter to which economists pay little attention.)
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TABLE 2 Countries with populations above 100 million, 2005 and
2050 (estimates and projections)
2005 2050
Country Population Country Population
China 1,300 India 1,593
India 1,103 China 1,382
United States 298 United States 395
Indonesia 223 Pakistan 305
Brazil 186 Indonesia 285
Pakistan 158 Nigeria 258
Russia 143 Brazil 253
Bangladesh 142 Bangladesh 243
Nigeria 132 Congo DR 177
Japan 128 Ethiopia 170
Mexico 107 Mexico 139
Philippines 127
Uganda 127
Egypt 126
Viet Nam 117
Japan 112
Russia 112
Iran 102
Turkey 101
SOURCE: United Nations 2005 (medium-variant projections); China excluding Taiwan.
TABLE 1 Population and population change by major country and region,
estimates and projections, 1950–2050
Percent increase
Population (millions)
1950– 2000–
Country/region 1950 2000 2050 2000 2050
North America 172 315 438 83 39
Latin America and
the Caribbean 167 523 783 213 50
Europea 547 728 653 33 –10
(EU-25) (350) (450) (450) 29 0
Muslim tierb 148 545 1,109 268 103
Sub-Saharan Africa 180 670 1,692 272 152
Japan 84 127 112 51 –12
Chinac 549 1,259 1,382 129 10
India 358 1,021 1,593 185 56
Southeast Asia 178 519 752 192 45
Other Asiab and Oceania 128 379 562 196 48
World 2,519 6,086 9,076 142 49
aIncluding Russia.
bMuslim tier taken as 20 West Asian and North African countries (see endnote 2).
cIncluding Hong Kong, excluding Taiwan.
SOURCE: United Nations 2005 (medium-variant projections); Taiwan Statistical Yearbook.
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TABLE 3 Projected proportions of population below age 15 and aged 65 and
older, selected countries and regions, 2005, 2025, and 2050
0–14 65 +
Country/region 2005 2025 2050 2005 2025 2050
Japan 14.0 12.5 13.4 19.7 29.1 35.9
EU-25 16.4 14.4 13.4 16.4 22.6 29.9
United States 20.7 18.7 17.3 12.3 17.7 20.6
China 21.4 17.9 15.7 7.6 13.7 23.6
India 32.1 24.4 18.3 5.3 8.1 14.8
Africa 41.5 36.9 28.7 3.4 4.2 6.7
SOURCE: United Nations 2005 (medium-variant projections) and Eurostat.
TABLE 4 Population sizes of major regional trade pacts or
common markets (existing or in prospect), 2005 and as projected
to 2050 (millions)
2005 2050
European Union (EU-25) 460 450
NAFTA 438 577
CSNa 375 527
APT (ASEAN Plus Three)b 2,031 2,285
(ASEAN) (555) (749)
SAARCc 1,453 2,220
African Union 906 1,937
aComunidad Sudamericana de Naciones (South American Community of Nations)
bComprising the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China, Japan, and South
Korea
cSouth Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SOURCE: United Nations 2005 (medium-variant projections) and Eurostat.
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TABLE 5 Rural population size and proportions rural in China
and India, 2005 and 2030
China India
Rural Rural
population Percent population Percent
(millions) rural (millions) rural
2005 784 59.6 786 71.3
2030 574 39.7 859 59.3
SOURCE: United Nations 2006.
TABLE 6 Youth cohort size, China and India: Age group 18–23 years, 2000–2050
(in millions, showing low- and high-variant projection range)
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
China 116 137 108–110 85–121 74–131 61–119
India 111 134 139–140 124–157 104–165 86–160
SOURCE: United Nations 2005.
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FIGURE 1   Demographic background to European
immigration: European Union (EU-25) compared to
its “southern hinterland,” 1950–2050
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Sub-Saharan Africa +
Muslim tier
SOURCE: United Nations 2005 (estimates and medium-variant projections).
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FIGURE 2   Demographic background to globalization:
China and India compared to European Union (EU-25)
and the United States, 1950–2050
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SOURCE: United Nations 2005 (estimates and medium-variant projections).
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